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Abstract
The Minority Game (MG) is a basic multi-agent model representing a simplified and binary form
of the bar attendance model of Arthur. The model has an informationally efficient phase in which
the agents lack the capability of exploiting any information in the winning action time series. We
illustrate how a theory can be constructed based on the ranking patterns of the strategies and the
number of agents using a particular rank of strategies as the game proceeds. The theory is applied
to calculate the distribution or probability density function in the number of agents making a
particular decision. From the distribution, the standard deviation in the number of agents making
a particular choice (e.g., the bar attendance) can be calculated in the efficient phase as a function
of the parameter m specifying the agent’s memory size. Since situations with tied cumulative
performance of the strategies often occur in the efficient phase and they are critical in the decision
making dynamics, the theory is constructed to take into account the effects of tied strategies. The
analytic results are found to be in better agreement with numerical results, when compared with
the simplest forms of the crowd-anticrowd theory in which cases of tied strategies are ignored.
The theory is also applied to a version of minority game with a networked population in which
connected agents may share information.
Paper to be presented in the 10th Annual Workshop on Economic Heterogeneous
Interacting Agents (WEHIA 2005), 13-15 June 2005, University of Essex, UK.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Agent-based models represent an efficient way in exploring how individual (microscopic)
behaviour may affect the global (macroscopic) behaviour in a competing population. This
theme of relating macroscopic to microscopic behaviour has been the focus of many studies
in physical systems, e.g., macroscopic magnetic properties of a material stem from the local
microscopic interactions of magnetic moments between atoms making up of the material. In
recent years, physicists have constructed interesting models for non-traditional systems and
established new branches in physics such as econophysics and sociophysics. The Minority
Game (MG) proposed by Challet and Zhang [1, 2] and the Binary-Agent-Resource (B-A-R)
model proposed by Johnson and Hui [3, 4, 5, 6, 7], for example, represent a typical physicists’
binary abstraction of the bar attendance problem proposed by Arthur [8, 9]. In MG, agents
repeatedly compete to be in a minority group. The agents have similar capabilities, but
are heterogeneous in that they use different strategies in making decisions. Decisions are
made based on the cumulative performance of the strategies that an agent holds. The
performance is a record of the correctness of the predictions of a strategy on the winning
action which, in turn, is related to the collective behaviour of the agents. Thus, the agents
interact through their decision-making process, creation of the record of winning actions,
and strategy selection process. Interesting quantities for investigations include the statistics
of the fraction of agents making a particular choice A(t) every time step and the variance
or standard deviation (SD) σ of this number [1, 4]. These quantities are related in that
knowing the distribution of A, one may obtain σ. The MG, suitably modified, can be used
to model financial markets and reproduce stylized facts. The variance, for example, is a
quantity related to the volatility in markets [4].
Recently, we proposed a theory of agent-based models based on the consideration of
decision-making and strategy dynamics [10]. The importance of the strategy selection dy-
namics has been pointed out by D’Hulst and Rodgers [11]. This approach [10, 11], which we
refer to as the strategy-ranking theory (SRT), emphasizes on how the strategies performance
ranking pattern changes as the game proceeds and the number of agents using a strategy
in a certain rank for making decisions. It is recognized that the SRT has the advantages
of including tied strategies into consideration and avoiding the troublesome in considering
each strategy’s performance separately. The theory, thus, represents a generalization of the
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crowd-anticrowd theory [4, 6, 12, 13] to cases with tied strategies and strategy ranking evo-
lutions – two factors that are particularly important in the so-called informationally efficient
phase of the MG. The theory has been applied successfully to explain non-trivial features
in the mean success rate of the agents in (i) MG with a population of non-networked [11] or
networked agents [10, 14], (ii) MG with some randomly participating agents [15], and (iii)
B-A-R model with a tunable resource level [7]. In this conference paper, we aim to illustrate
the basic ideas of SRT. In particular, we present results based on SRT in evaluating the
distribution of A(t) and σ, in the efficient phase of MG in non-networked and networked
populations. Validity of the results of our theory is tested against results obtained by nu-
merical simulations. While the SRT was developed within the context of MG, many of the
ideas are should also be appliable to a wide range of agent-based models.
II. MODEL: THE MINORITY GAME
The basic MG [1, 2] comprises of N agents competing to be in a minority group at each
time step. The only information available to the agents is the history. The history is a
bit-string of length m recording the minority (i.e., winning) option for the most recent m
time steps. There are a total of 2m possible history bit-strings. For example, m = 2 has
22 = 4 possible histories of the winning outcomes: 00, 01, 10 and 11. At the beginning of
the game, each agent picks s strategies, with repetition allowed. They make their decisions
based on their strategies. A strategy is a look up table with 2m entries giving the predictions
for all possible history bit-strings. Since each entry can either be ‘0’ or ‘1’, the full strategy
pool contains 22
m
strategies. Adaptation is built in by allowing the agents to accumulate a
merit (virtual) point for each of her s strategies as the game proceeds, with the initial merit
points set to zero for all strategies. Strategies that predicted the winning (losing) action at
a given time step, are assigned (deducted) one virtual point. At each turn, the agent follows
the prediction of her best-scoring strategy. In case of tied best-scoring strategies, a random
choice will be made to break the tie.
In the present work, we will focus on the regime where 2 · 2m ≪ N · s, i.e., the efficient
phase. In MG literature, a parameter α = 2m/N is defined with α < αc ≈ 0.34 characterizing
the efficient phase [16]. Features in this regime is known to be dominated by the crowd effect
[12, 13]. A quantitative theory in this regime would have to include the consideration of
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frequently occurred tied strategies into account, as the dynamics in this regime is highly
sensitive to the agents’ strategy selection. In what follows, we introduce the basic physical
picture of the strategy ranking theory and apply it to evaluate the distribution in the fraction
of agents making a particular choice P (A) and the variance σ2 from an analytic expression
for non-networked and networked populations.
III. NUMERICAL AND ANALYTICAL RESULTS: NON-NETWORKED
AGENTS
To put our discussions into proper context, we will first present the numerical results of
the quantities that we are focusing on. Let A(t) be the fraction of agents taking the action
“1” (or “0”) at time step t. As the game proceeds, there will be a time series A(t). We
may then analyze these values of A(t) by considering the distribution or probability density
function P (A), where P (A)dA is the probability of having a value within the interval A
to A + dA. In using the MG for market modelling, A(t) can be taken to be the fraction
of agents deciding to buy (or sell) an asset at time t. In the context of the El Farol bar
attendance problem [8, 9], A(t) may be taken to be the fraction of agents attending the bar.
Note that every realization of the MG may have a different distribution of strategies among
the agents and a different initial bit-string to start the game. These details do not affect
the main results reported here, especially when we consider cases deep into the efficient
phase, i.e., when 2 · 2m ≪ N . To illustrate the point, we have carried out detailed numerical
simulations for the simplest case of m = 1 and s = 2. Figure 1 shows the numerical results
(squares) of P (A) for systems with two different sizes (N = 129 and N = 4097), with the
aim of emphasizing the size effect on P (A). Notice that the distribution consists of a few
peaks (five peaks for the case of m = 1 and s = 2), indicating that as the game proceeds the
number A(t) jumps among values characterized by these peak values. For larger population,
the peaks are sharper. Also shown in Fig.1 are the results of the strategy ranking theory
(lines). The theoretical results are in reasonably agreement with numerical results. We defer
the discussion on obtaining the theoretical results to the next section.
Besides the typical results shown in Fig.1, we have studied the variance σ2 in the following
way. We carried out numerical simulations in many realizations using different values of m
and N , with N up to 8193 and m up to 8. For each run, a value of σ2 is obtained. To
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FIG. 1: The probability density function P (A) of the fraction of agents making a particular decision
for a typical run with s = 2 and m = 1: (a) N=129 and (b) N=4097. The symbols are results
obtained by numerical simulations. The lines give the results of the strategy ranking theory. The
peak around A = 0.5 comes from the time steps that we have classified as even time steps in the
theory. The peaks on the two sides come from the odd time steps, where there are registered
virtual points in the strategies for the history bit-string concerned. For a system of larger size, the
peaks are sharper.
facilitate comparison with theory, we select those data that are deep in the efficient phase,
i.e., with 2 · 2m/N < 0.125 and plotted them (black dots) in Fig.2 to show the dependence
of σ2/N2 on m. The data points do not show significant scatter, and essentially fall on a
line. Also included in the figure are two (dashed) lines corresponding to two approximations
within the crowd-anticrowd theory [6, 12, 13]. These approximations assume that all the
strategies can be ranked at every time step without tied virtual points. One of them assumes
that the popularity rankings, i.e., ranking based on the number of agents using a strategy,
of a strategy and its anti-correlated partner are uncorrelated and gives an expression for
σ2/N2 for cases with s = 2 as [12]
σ2flat
N2
=
1
24× 2m
[
1− ( 1
2m+1
)2
]
. (1)
Another approximation is that the ranking of strategies are highly correlated. For example,
the anti-correlated partner of the momentarily most-popular strategy is the least-popular
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FIG. 2: The variance σ2/ N2 as a function of m, N ranging from 129 to 8193. Only data points
satisfying 2 · 2m/N < 1/8 are shown. The dashed lines give the two approximations within the
crowd-anticrowd theory. The open squares give the results, which are in good agreement with
numerical results in the small m regime, of the strategy ranking theory.
one, and so on. This leads to another expression within the crowd-anticrowd theory [12]:
σ2delta
N2
=
1
12× 2m
[
1− ( 1
2m+1
)2
]
. (2)
We note that for small values of m, the numerical data fall within the two crowd-anticrowd
approximations, with neither of the approximations capturing the m-dependence of σ2/N2.
As will be discussed later, the strategy ranking theory gives an analytic expression for
σ2/N2 that captures the m-dependence very well in the small m regime where the criteria
2 · 2m/N ≪ 1 is satisfied to a fuller extent.
IV. STRATEGY RANKING THEORY: KEY IDEAS
We proceed to discuss how we could obtain the analytic results shown in Figs.1 and 2,
within the strategy ranking theory. Details of the theory can be found in [10, 11, 15]. Here
we briefly summarize the key ideas, with the aim to make the theory physically transparent.
We note that in MG and other agent-based models of competing populations, it is the
interplay between decision-making, strategy selections, and collective response that leads
to the non-trivial and often interesting global behaviour of a system. With this in mind,
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the strategy performance ranking pattern is of crucial importance. At any time step, the
strategies can be classified into κ+1 ranks, according to the virtual points of the strategies.
The momentarily best-performing strategy (or strategies) belongs (belong) to rank-1, and
so on. At the beginning of the game, all strategies are tied that thus they all belong to the
same rank. This is also the case when the strategies are all tied during the game. Thus, the
lower bound of κ is zero. It is also noted that there are two different kinds of behaviour in
the ranking pattern after a time step: (i) the number of different ranks increases and such
a time step is called an “even” time step, and (ii) the number of different ranks decreases
and such a time step is called an “odd” time step. Take, for example, a time step at which
the strategies are all tied before decision. Regardless of the history based on which the
agents decide and the wining outcome after the agents decided, the strategies split into two
ranks, i.e., κ increases from 0 to 1 after the time step. Half of the strategies belong to
the better rank and half to the worse rank, as half of the strategies would have predicted
the correct winning outcome for the history concerned. Generally speaking, the underlying
mechanism for this splitting is that there is no registered virtual point or stored information
in the strategies for the history concerned. We call this kind of time steps “even” time steps
because this is what would happen when the population encounters a history for decision
that had occurred an even number of times since the beginning of the game, not counting
the one that is currently in use for decisions.
The parameter κ has another physical meaning. It is the number of history bit-strings
that have occurred an odd number of times since the beginning of the game, regardless the
current history in use for decisions. Since there are at most 2m history bit-strings for a given
m, the upper bound of κ is 2m. Thus we have 0 ≤ κ ≤ 2m. Therefore, every time step as
the game proceeds can be classified as “even” or “odd”, together with a parameter κ. For
κ = 0 when all the strategies are tied, the time step is necessarily an even time step. For
κ = 2m where there are 2m + 1 ranks, the time step is necessarily an odd time step since
all the histories have occurred an odd number of times, including the current history in use
for decisions. Noting that the total number of strategies is 22
m
, there are in general several
strategies in a certain ranking. In this way, the theory takes explicit account of cases of tied
strategies.
For even time steps (regardless of the value of κ), there is no registered virtual points in
the strategies for the current history. Therefore, even time steps are characterized by agents
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making random decisions [10, 11, 14, 15]. Using a random walk argument, the distribution
Peven,κ(A) = Peven(A) is a normal distribution independent of κ, with a mean µeven = 0.5
and a variance σ2even = 1/(4N), i.e.,
Peven(A) =
1√
2πσeven
exp
(
−(A− µeven)
2
2σ2even
)
. (3)
It turns out that the part of the distribution around A = 0.5 shown in Fig.1 originates from
the even time steps.
For odd time steps, there are registered virtual points or stored information in the strate-
gies for the current history. This is the origin of the crowd effect [6, 12, 13], which is
fundamental to the understanding of collective response in the class of agent-based models
based on MG. In this case, the momentarily better performing strategies have predicted the
correct action in the last occurrence of the current history in use for decision. There will then
be more agents using these better-performing strategies for decisions. However, the number
is too large, hence forming a crowd, that the winning action in the last occurrence becomes
the losing action in this turn. This is the anti-persistent nature or double periodicity of MG
[16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. Using the strategy ranking theory, we know that there are (κ + 1)
ranks among the strategies for time steps labelled κ. The ratio of the fractions of strategies
in different ranks is given by [10] Cκ0 : C
κ
1 : · · · : Cκℓ : · · · : Cκκ , which are simply the numbers
in the Pascal triangles. Given that the agents use their best-performing strategy for deci-
sion, we can readily count the number of agents using a strategy in a particular rank. As
mentioned, the better-performing strategies are more likely to lead to wrong predictions at
odd time steps. This can be modelled by a winning probability at odd time steps of the form
of (ℓ − 1)/κ for a strategy belonging to rank-ℓ, for a given value of κ [10, 11]. Putting the
information together, we arrive at the probability density function Podd,κ(A) for 1 ≤ κ ≤ 2m.
The distribution Podd,κ(A) is given by normal distributions centered at the mean values of
µ±odd,κ = 0.5±
C2κ−1κ−1
22κ
(4)
with a variance
σ2odd,κ =
C2κ−2κ−2
22κ−1
1
4N
. (5)
Applying Eq. (4) to the results for m = 1 in Fig.1, we immediately identify that the peaks
in P (A) at A = 1/4 and A = 3/4 are originated from odd time steps corresponding to κ = 1
and the peaks at A = 0.6875 and 0.3125 are originated from odd time steps corresponding
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to κ = 2. These peaks are more noticeable in Fig. 1(b) when the population size is large. In
Eq. (5), the binomial coefficients should formally be expressed in terms of Gamma functions,
so that when the lower index in the coefficient becomes negative, σodd,κ vanishes. This is
the case for κ = 1, and the corresponding distribution will then be very sharp. This is, for
example, the case for the sharp peaks at A = 1/4 and A = 3/4 in Fig. (1).
To obtain an expression for the overall P (A), including both even and odd time steps
and all possible values of κ, we need to take a weighted average over the occurrence of odd
and even time steps [10]. The resulting expression is
P (A) =
2m∑
κ=0
C2
m
κ
22m
[(
κ
2m
)Podd,κ(A) + (1− κ
2m
)Peven(A)], (6)
where the factor C2
m
κ /2
2m is the probability of having κ history bit-strings occurred an odd
number of times. The factor κ/2m is the probability that given κ, the time step is odd.
Applying Eq. (6) to the case of m = 1, we obtain the results (lines) shown in Fig. 1. We
note that the expression in Eq. (6) is also applicable to m > 1, as long as the efficient phase
criteria is satisfied.
The calculation of the variance follows from the definition
σ2 = N2〈(A− A)2〉t, (7)
where A = 0.5 is the mean value of A and the average 〈· · ·〉t represents a time average.
Replacing the time average by invoking the probability density function P (A), we have
σ2
N2
=
∫
1
0
(A− 0.5)2P (A)dA
=
2m∑
κ=0
C2
m
κ
22m
{
(
κ
2m
)[
1
2
(0.5− µ+odd,κ)2 +
1
2
(0.5− µ−odd,κ)2 + σ2odd,κ] + (1−
κ
2m
)σ2even
}
(8)
≈
2m∑
κ=0
C2
m
κ
22m
(
κ
2m
)(
C2κ−1κ−1
22κ
)2
=
2m∑
κ=0
C2
m
κ
22m
(
κ
2m
)

1
2
κ∏
q=1
(1− 1
2q
)


2
, (9)
where the approximation is valid for 2.2m/N << 1. Eq. (9) is an analytic expression for σ2.
The last two expressions are equivalent and one may use whichever convenient in obtaining
numerical values from Eq. (9).
Several remarks are worth mentioning. Firstly, we note that the expression of σ2 is closely
related to the analytic expression for the winning probability reported in [10], from which
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an alternative approach arriving at the same result is possible [22]. Secondly, the results
from Eq. (9) are plotted (open squares) in Fig.2. We note that the strategy ranking theory
does capture the m-dependence of σ2/N2, with good agreement with numerical simulation
results in the range where the criteria 2 · 2m/N ≪ 1 is better fulfilled [11]. The success of
the theory stems from the inclusion of tied strategies, as each rank typically consists of a
number of strategies. In the simplest case of m = 1, for example, there are tied strategies in
every time step of the game. The better agreement with numerical results when compared
with the crowd-anticrowd approximations is thus an indication of the importance of (i) the
tied strategies and (ii) the time evolution of the ranking pattern from time step to time
step. In MG, both the number of tied strategies, i.e., number of strategies belonging to
the same rank, and the time evolution of strategy ranking pattern can be readily found.
Thirdly, the result Eq. (9) is interesting in that there have been much effort in trying to
re-scale numerical results of σ2 as a function of the parameter α = 2m/N so that results from
systems of different values of N and m can be collapsed onto a single curve. Eq. (9) suggests
that σ2/N2 is a complicated function of m, deep in the efficient phase. In particular, as one
increases the population size at fixed and small m, one should approach the result given
by Eq.(9) assuming a uniform initial distribution of strategies to the agents. It is, in fact,
possible to include the effects of a finite population size N into the strategy-ranking theory
starting from Eq. (8) by incorporating the so-called market impact effects [11, 14, 22].
V. NETWORKED AGENTS
Systems in the real world are characterized by connected agents [23]. The connections
are often used for collecting information from the neighbours. Recently, several interesting
attempts [10, 14, 24, 25, 26] have been made to incorporate information sharing mechanisms
among the agents into MG and B-A-R models. As an illustration of the application of
SRT to networked MG, we focus on the model proposed by Anghel et al. [14, 24]. As
in the MG, Anghel et al.’s model [24] features N agents who repeatedly compete to be in
a minority group. Communications between agents are introduced by assuming that the
agents are connected by an undirected random network, i.e., classical random graph, with
a connectivity p being the probability that a link between two randomly chosen agents
exists. The links are used as follows. Each agent compares the cumulated performance
10
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FIG. 3: The probability density function P (A) of the fraction of agents making a particular
decision for a typical run with s = 2, m = 1 and N = 1001 in the networked model of Anghel
et al. [24] for two different values of the connectivity p = 0.01 (upper panel) and p = 0.02 (lower
panel). The symbols are results obtained by numerical simulations. The lines give the results of
the strategy ranking theory.
of his predictor, which is the suggested action from his own best-performing strategy at
each time step, with that of his neighbours, and then follows the suggested action of the
best performing predictor among his neighbours and himself. The p = 0 limit of the model
reduces to the MG. Note that the identity of the best-performing strategy changes over time.
For p > 0 the predictor’s performance is generally different from the agent’s performance. It
has been reported that the efficiency of the population as a whole, characterized by either σ2
[24] or by the average winning probability per agent per turn [14], shows a non-monotonic
dependence on the connectivity p with the most efficient performance occurring at a small
but finite value of p. In other words, a small fraction of links is beneficial but too many of
them are bad. We have explained the feature successfully within the framework of SRT [14].
The most important point is that, from our understanding of the non-networked MG (e.g.,
see Fig. 1), the performance of an agent actually depends on how similar the s = 2 strategies
that he is holding, with the best performing ones holding two identical strategies. The links
then act in two ways depending on the connectivity. For low connectivity, the links bring
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the agents with two anti-correlated strategies to have the chance to use other strategies so
that these agents will not always join the crowd at odd time steps and hence with their
winning probability enhanced. For high connectivity, there are so many links that many
agents are linked to the momentarily best-performing predictor or predictors. As discussed
in previous section, the higher ranking strategies have a smaller chance of predicting the
correct minority outcome. When the connectivity is high, there are many links so that
agents have access to strategies that are more likely to lose. This leads to a drop in the
average winning probability of the agents [14].
Figure 3 shows how the distribution P (A) changes with the connectivity p at two small
values of p. The range of small p is particularly of interest since for a large population
(N = 1001) the non-monotonic feature occurs for p < 0.01. The symbols (open circles) give
the results from numerical simulations. The peaks of the distribution P (A) shifts as p is
varied. Applying SRT and incorporating the effects of the presence of links, we found that
P (A) can again be represented by a weighted sum of distributions characterized by different
kinds of time steps. In particular, for p = 0.01, the parameters of the distributions in Eq. (4)
can be found [14, 22] to be µ−odd,κ=1 = 0.207, µ
−
odd,κ=2 = 0.278, and µ
+
odd,κ=1,2 = 1−µ−odd,κ=1,2.
The variances are given by Eq. (5) as σ2odd,κ=1 = 0 and σ
2
odd,κ=2 = 1/32N . Similarly for
p = 0.02, we have µ−odd,κ=1 = 0.075 and µ
−
odd,κ=2 = 0.160, with the same variances. The
values of these parameters are obtained by considering the different winning probabilities of
the strategies in different ranks and the change in the number of agents using a strategy of a
certain rank due to the presence of the links. The solid lines in Fig. 3 show the distributions
obtained by SRT. The theory captures the shifts in P (A) with the connectivity p.
VI. SUMMARY
In the present work, we illustrated the basic ideas in constructing a strategy ranking
theory for a class of multi-agent models incorporating the effects of tied strategies and
strategy selections. We showed how the theory can be applied to MG in the efficient phase
to evaluate the distribution P (A) in the fraction of agents making a particular decision
and the associated variance σ2. In particular, an analytic expression is given for σ2 in a
non-networked population. The theory is also applied to a version of networked MG in
which there exists non-trivial dependence on the performance of the agents as a function
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of the connectivity. Besides P (A) and σ2, the theory can also be applied to evaluate other
quantities such as the average winning probability of the agents. In closing, while SRT
is developed with models based on the MG in mind, the general approach, namely that of
focusing on the ranking pattern of the strategies and how the pattern evolves in time, should
be a key ingredient in the construction of theories for a large class of agent-based models.
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